MACHINE IDENTITY REGISTRY ARCHITECTURE · MIRA 1.0 CONNECTING… · 0 PASSPORTS
Identity infrastructure for autonomous machines

Every robot carries a passport.

A manufacturer issues it once, the machine proves it holds the matching private key, and anyone can check what that machine is allowed to do — without trusting a sticker on its chassis.

MIRA 1.0Passport schema
Ed25519Machine identity key
4 domainsPublic to classified
Hash-chainedLifecycle ledger

Cryptographic identity

The private key is generated inside the robot and never leaves it. The passport anchors only the public key, so possession can be tested at any time.

Capability transparency

Standard codes state what the machine can do, how close it works to people, and what happens when it fails safe.

Recalls that travel

Suspensions, recalls and decommissioning are signed events on the passport, so a grounded machine reads as grounded everywhere.

How a passport is created and used

Sequence
01

Enroll

The manufacturer submits a genesis record. The serial number is hashed before publication.

02

Bind key

The robot generates a key pair in secure hardware and exports only the public half.

03

Publish

The genesis transaction is anchored, and the passport ID becomes the machine's permanent name.

04

Challenge

Any verifier sends a nonce. Only the real machine can return a valid signature.

Live in this prototype

What actually runs

Real key pairs

Enrollment generates a genuine Ed25519 or P-256 key pair in your browser with WebCrypto.

Real challenge-response

Verification signs a random nonce and checks it against the passport's public key. Tamper with it and the check fails.

Real hash chain

Every lifecycle event is SHA-256 linked to the one before it, and the chain can be re-verified or deliberately broken.

Manufacturer portal

Initial robot enrollment

Build a MIRA 1.0 genesis record. The passport preview on the right updates as you type.

Manufacturer identity

The organization accountable for the machine leaving the factory.

Machine identity

One enrollment describes one physical robot.

Hashed before it reaches the public record.
A dynamically balanced machine can fall over. Say so.
Self-docking machines work when nobody is watching.
Comma separated. Changes later are recorded as lifecycle events.

Capabilities and safety

Declare every capability the hardware has, including any disabled in software.

Hazard level drives the colour band on the passport and the checks a verifier is expected to run before granting a machine access to a site.

Keys and disclosure

Bind the machine's public key and decide how much of the passport is world-readable.

The private key never leaves the robot. Generate it in a TPM, secure element or HSM. Only the public half is entered here.
Civil equipment only. This registry does not enroll weapons systems or military platforms. Records declaring them are rejected at enrollment.
Uses WebCrypto. The private key stays in this tab and is used later on the Verify page.

Issuer signing key

Your key as the manufacturer, held in this browser. Generate it here and the registry node never sees the private half — it can validate your enrollments but cannot forge one.

Checking…
A restricted domain stops the record reaching the public ledger in this prototype. Restricted civil deployments run on separately accredited infrastructure with their own validators.

Review and submit

Confirm the package, then create the genesis transaction.

SIMULATED Submitting hashes the package and mints a local passport. No wallet, payment, node or external API is contacted.
Ready. Complete the form to prepare a genesis transaction.

Genesis transaction accepted

Passport ID:
Transaction hash:
Block:
Public verification

Verify a robot passport

Look up the passport, then challenge the machine to prove it holds the matching private key.

Public ledger

Passport registry

Every passport published to the public domain in this prototype, including ones you enroll.

Passport IDModelManufacturerCategoryHazardStatus

Select a row to open the passport and its lifecycle ledger.

Signed event history

Lifecycle ledger

Ownership, firmware, inspections and recalls are appended as hash-linked events. Break one and every later link fails.

Protocol architecture

One schema. Four security domains.

A civil registry. Weapons systems and military platforms are out of scope and rejected at enrollment.

Public

Civilian machines, revocations and safety status, readable by anyone.

Enterprise

Permissioned fleet, maintenance and ownership records on the same schema.

Civil government

Transit, utilities, postal and municipal fleets. Independently operated, own validators.

Restricted

Commercially sensitive civil fleets on isolated infrastructure. No public anchor.

MIRA 1.0 record fields

Still to build

This prototype runs entirely in the browser. Production needs:

  • Wallet authentication and transaction fees
  • Manufacturer credential verification against a root of trust
  • On-robot state proof over a real transport
  • Blockchain RPC, indexer and revocation service
  • Encrypted off-chain storage for restricted fields
  • Regulator interfaces for recall and grounding orders

Open questions

  • Who may revoke a passport besides its issuer?
  • How is a resold, re-flashed machine re-checked?
  • What is the minimum public disclosure for a machine on a public road?
  • How do two domains cross-verify without leaking membership?